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The relationship between increasing women’s earnings and rising divorce rates frequently has
been explained by the so-called independence effect: If a wife enjoys a higher earning than her
husband does, she gains less from marriage. It has also been argued that in a society with
egalitarian gender attitudes this effect is less important. In this paper, we test if the independence
effect applies to Sweden, a country in which egalitarian gender views dominate and female
labor-force participation and divorce rates are high. Our analysis is based on a large register data
set and intensity regression models. We found support for the ‘independence effect’: The linear
relationship between the share of a wife’s income and the divorce risk is positive. We also found
that the higher the total income of the couple, the lower their divorce risk, but this relationship
appears to be less strong.
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1. Introduction
Women’s participation in the labor force and divorce rates have been increasing in parallel in
recent decades. The rise in divorce rates accelerated in the second half of the 1960s and in the
1970s throughout the western world. The past decades have also witnessed a marked flow of
women into the labor market. The relationship between increasing women’s earnings and rising
divorce rates frequently has been explained by the so-called independence effect: When a woman
makes an income that allows her to be financially self-supporting, she would find it relatively
easy to exit a marriage should she wish to do so. More generally, if a wife earns more money
than her husband does, her gains are less from marriage than a wife’s whose earnings are lower
(Becker, Lands & Michael, 1977). Proponents of the independence effect claim that it would
destabilize the relationship between a woman and her husband if the former enjoyed a higher
income (Ross & Sawhill, 1975; Moore & Waite, 1981; Spitze & South, 1985; Heckert, Nowak &
Snyder, 1998; Ono, 1998).
Several recent studies that use individual level data and advanced statistical methods have
challenged the independence effect thesis (see Sayer & Bianchi, 2000, for a literature review).
The main argument is that gender ideology mediates the effect of women's relative income on
divorce risks (Greenstein, 1995; Oppenheimer, 1997; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000; Brennan et al.,
2001). The authors claim that the independence effect thesis is based on traditional gender
ideology: When men are mainly engaged in labor-market activity and women are not, women are
economically dependent on men. Woman's employment thus does not meet the traditional norm
and therefore destabilizes the marriage, so the argument goes. However, in a modern western
society, the labor market roles of both sexes have become increasingly similar. This is reflected
in a gender ideology that has become increasingly egalitarian. In this context, then, equal income
of both partners stabilizes rather than destabilizes marriage. Oppenheimer (1997) pointed out that
support for the independence effect hypothesis was found only in cross-sectional aggregate-level
studies that use data from the 1950s and 1960s, i.e. when the different family and labor market
roles of men and women were still a dominating social norm.
Oppenheimer (1997) distinguished the independence effect from the income effect. Focusing
only on the ratio of a wife’s income to that of her husband and ignoring its interaction with the
absolute income level of the family “tends to distract attention from the underlying causes of
these ratios and their structure determinants” (Oppenheimer, 1997, p. 431). The income effect
implies that a higher total income of the family improves the quality of family life and thereby
enhances marital stability. From this perspective, a higher wife’s income should have a4
stabilizing influence on the marriage as it increases the total family income. So far, only a few
studies have distinguished between the independence and income effect. They found the income
effect to be weak or non-existent (Greenstein, 1990, 1995).
Sørensen & McLanahan (1987) have argued that a wife’s relative income is a valid measure of
her economic dependency at all income levels, including that of families with a very high
income. Here, the wife may be able to earn money at a level that would allow her to support
herself financially. But if the husband has higher earnings, she is dependent on him for
maintaining her current living standard and possibly also her social status.
Nock (2001) has introduced the concept of marriages of equally dependent spouses (MEDS),
defined as unions in which either of the spouses generates between 40 to 60% of the couple’s
total income. He has shown that in this case, the wife’s commitment to the marriage is lower
than in other marriages. The husband’s commitment, by contrast, does not depend on earnings.
The wife’s commitment also decreased with the amount of time she spent in paid work. In sum,
Nock (2001) has argued that MEDS lead to higher divorce risks mainly because the wife gains
less from the partnership, and because the threshold to leave the marriage is relatively low. These
arguments are in similar vein to those concerning the independence effect. However, in addition
to the economic independence thesis, he argued that the relationship quality suffers because of
the wife’s perception that the household tasks are unfairly distributed to her disadvantage. This is
because men’s attitudes to housework have not matched the increase in women’s labor-force
participation. Note that it may be the wife only who perceives the relationship quality to be
suffering. As Sayer & Bianchi (2000) have shown, the wife’s satisfaction and happiness with the
relationship is a predictor of its divorce, whereas this does not apply to the husband.
Social exchange theorists have hypothesized that a husband uses his non-economic instead of
financial resources to maintain what he perceives to be a stable marriage (see Sabaelli and
Shehan, 1993, for a literature review). Such resources include love, status, goods and
information (Foa & Foa, 1980). If the wife perceives the threshold to exit her marriage low
because of her capacity to earn sufficient income of her own, the exchangeable resources of the
husband may counterbalance the negative effect that the wife's higher income possibly has on
marital stability.
Results from earlier studies vary in a number of aspects, and the way and extent to which the
wife’s income is related to the divorce risk is not clear. On the one hand, and given the more
egalitarian gender views today, equal incomes would not have a destabilizing effect on marriage.
On the other hand, it would be easier for either of the spouses to exit an unhappy marriage if one5
spouse did not depend on the income of the other. In addition, one needs to consider the level of
the combined income of both spouses. Hence, in what way and to what extent does the wife’s
income, and in particular its ratio to the income of the husband, influence the risk of divorce? In
this paper, we address this question by applying it to Sweden, one of the countries with the least
traditional system of gender relations and ideology.
Sweden is well known for its high female participation rate in the labor force. There has been a
political commitment to sustaining equality between men and women in family and society
(Hirdman, 1998). During the 1960s and 1970s, a series of social policies were introduced that
aimed at ensuring equal status between the sexes. In 1974, a parental leave program was
established according to which employed women / men with young children received 90% of
their income if they stayed at home during the first six months of the child’s life (this was later
extended to 12 months). Full job security for that period was provided. The entitlement period
was later prolonged to 15 months, of which at least one month has to be taken by the other parent
(see Sundström & Duvander, 1999). The benefit level stood at 80% of the claimant’s average
earnings during the 240 days preceding birth. More than half of the fathers take at least some
parental leave after the birth of their first child and 11% take three or more months (Oláh, 2001).
These policies stimulated the rate of women’s labor force participation in Sweden to reach a very
high level: it increased from 53% in 1963 to 86 % in 1990 (Hirdman, 1998), in 1991 the level
stood at 78%, and in 2000 at 71% (European Commission, 2002). Female earnings relative to
men’s increased, too (Henz & Sundström, 2001).
Sweden is also well known as the forerunner of many of the recent demographic trends that
Europe has been witnessing, such as an increase in consensual union formation and non-marital
childbearing. Less than 10 % of all unions in Sweden start as non-marital unions (Statistics
Sweden, 1995) and 55% of all children are born out of wedlock (Council of Europe, 2003).
About half of all Swedish women and nearly as much of all men have a non-marital partnership
at age 26 (Bernhardt, 2002). The 'no fault' rule applied in legal proceedings makes divorce
relatively easy to obtain. The rise of divorce rates throughout Europe accelerated in the second
half of the 1960s. In Sweden, this increase has continued over recent decades. The 1990s level of
the total divorce rate is among the highest in Europe: it ranges from 0.44 to 0.55 (Council of
Europe, 2003). Sweden has one of the highest union disruption levels in Europe (Andersson,
2003) considering the high prevalence of non-marital unions, which are after all less stable than
marriages,6
Before a couple divorces, the relationship usually goes through several stages: from becoming
disharmonious, through to marital discord and de facto separation (Figure 1). Factors that
increase the probability of marital discord ultimately also increase the probability of divorce, but
the economic and legal aspects of divorce act as constraints – in some cases stronger, in others
weaker – to couples who are about to make that transition. Divorce legislation is a typical factor
that influences the ease or difficulty with which a couple obtains a de jure divorce. In Sweden,
legal divorce barriers are minimal: In case of mutual agreement between the spouses, the
procedure usually takes about six months for couples with children (Andersson, 1997).
Obviously, divorce may also be accompanied by legal disputes over child custody and property,
in which case the procedure takes more time. There were no notable changes in Swedish divorce
laws during the period covered in our study (1981–1998).
Studies of Swedish divorce trends have highlighted that in the 1980s and 1990s divorce risks
increased in particular among couples who have children. At the same time, the number of
childless couples and unions with pre-marital children increased – both of these groups have
displayed a higher than average risk (Andersson, 1995). Andersson (1997) has demonstrated that
Swedish divorce risks vary by parity and the age of the youngest child. Liu (2002) has shown
that stepchildren have a detrimental effect on marital stability. We considered the results of both
studies when selecting and defining the control variables for the regression models in our paper.
Jalovaara (2001, 2003) has analyzed the association between socioeconomic positions and
divorce risk in Finland, a country adjacent to Sweden that shares many of the features in social
structure, the Nordic model of the welfare state, and cultural aspects with its neighbor. Let us
mention the high level of female labor force participation and the egalitarian gender ideology,
both of which particularly enhance the comparability of results from these two countries.
Furthermore, the system of registers in both countries allows to analyze the effect of
socioeconomic characteristics of both spouses on divorce. . Like several other works on different
countries, the Finnish ones confirmed the relationship between the socioeconomic status and
divorce is an inverse one. In an article on the interactive effects of spouses’ socioeconomic
positions, Jalovaara (2003) found that couples where the wife had a higher income than her
husband were somewhat more prone to divorce, net of the income level effects of both spouses
and a large number of socioeconomic and other control variables, thus showing some support for
the independence effect.
We base our paper on the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1 – independence effect:7
A wife who enjoys higher earnings than her husband has a lower economic threshold to leave an
unhappy marriage. The opposite applies to wives with a lower income. They face the prospects
of lower living standards and serious economic hardships in case of divorce. This is reflected in
higher divorce risks of couples if the wife’s earnings are higher than that of her husband. By the
same token, it is manifested in lower divorce risks if the wife makes less of an income than her
husband does.
Hypothesis 1a – effect of equally dependent spouses:
When the spouses contribute to the couple’s income 40–60%, their living standard depends to
roughly an equal extent on each other’s earnings. The wife is more likely to perceive the
distribution of household work as unfair. At the same time her threshold to exit the marriage is
relatively low as she is financially self-supporting. The divorce rates of such couples are thus
higher than that of couples where the wife earns less than 40% of it’s income.
Hypothesis 2 – income effect:
A higher combined income earned from employment improves the couple’s quality of life and in
this way enhances marriage stability. It follows that divorce risks decrease with the couple’s total
income rising.
Hypothesis 3 – social exchange effect:
A husband may compensate his wife’s higher earnings by offering important non-economic
resources, such as experience and education. Among couples where the wife earns more than the
husband does, the divorce risk is lower if the husband is older and / or his education level is
higher than that of the wife.
The prospect of being financially self-supporting without making substantial sacrifices in the
current living standard naturally lowers both partners’ barriers for divorce. The independence
effect and the equally dependent spouses hypotheses are mainly concerned with this stage of
transition to divorce, although the wife’s higher earnings may also be a source for marital
discord, if not a disharmonious marriage, if the couple believes in traditional gender roles. The
hypotheses on income effect and on the social exchange effect are primarily related to factors that
influence relationship quality.8
2.  Data and method
2.1. Data
We use a set of Swedish register data that contains records of all women born in Sweden
between 1945 and 1981. Statistics Sweden prepared it by linking individual-level information on
demographic, social and economic variables from different registers. In our study, we include
women who entered their first marriage between January 1981 and December 1998, and we
analyze the divorce risks of these unions. We limit our research to first marriages because
entering a second or higher order marriage is highly selective in Sweden. Our analysis is also
restricted to marriages between spouses born in Sweden, so as to eliminate any influence that the
cultural origin or cultural heterogeneity of spouses would have on our results. Furthermore, we
exclude both early (before age 20) and late first marriages (after age 35) to avoid distortion of
our results by sub-groups whose divorce risk is known to be substantially different.
The social and economic variables pertain either to the status at the end of a calendar year or
income received during the year. Demographic events – marriage, divorce, and birth of
children – are recorded to the precision of a month. The individual records of husbands are
linked to the records of their wives. This enables us to study the association of the combined
socio-economic characteristics of both spouses with marital stability.
2.2. Study  variables
Our dependent variable is the event of divorce measured at a month’s precision. The explanatory
variables that we use to test our hypotheses are relative income, total income, age difference and
relative level of education.
For both income variables, we use the total income from employment and social security benefits
(unemployment insurance, parental leave, student allowances). Since we apply this information
to explain divorce risks, we specify our models so that income received during year t is used to
explain the divorce risks during year t+1. Relative income is defined as the wife's contribution in
percentage to the total income of both spouses. The variable is represented in five categories,
using cut-points at every 20th percentile (Table 1). Total income is the sum of both spouses'
income adjusted for inflation and expressed in Swedish crowns (SEK) of the 1998 value. This
variable is listed in four categories that we obtained by using quartile cut-off points in the 1980
distribution of married couples by total income. Both of these variables are time-varying
covariates, the values of which are updated at the end of each calendar year.9
With spouses’ age difference and relative level of education we measure the potential resources
that a husband may use to compensate for his lower income. Age difference is calculated using
the spouses’ exact dates of birth. Education attainment refers to the highest level of education
obtained. We define it as a time-varying covariate that is updated each time the person completes
a higher level of education than he/she previously had. In this study, the education level is
categorized as (a) pre-gymnasium, including pre-school education and nine years of compulsory
basic education; (b) gymnasium, including upper secondary school (usually three years) and
adult education; (c) post-gymnasium, including college and university. The relative level of
education reflects the ratio of the spouses’ education level according to these three categories.
Hoem (1997a) has shown the emergence and increase of a negative correlation between a wife’s
education level and divorce risk in Sweden in the 1980s; a negative correlation has also been
found in the United States (Lillard & Waite, 1993).
In addition, we use in our models a number of control variables that are known to influence
divorce risk. Wife’s age at marriage is one of them: it is found to have a powerful impact on
marital breakdown, even more so than socio-economic status variables such as social class
(Murphy, 1985). We define the variable as a categorical covariate with three categories: 20–23,
24–28 and 29–35.
Many studies, including those using Swedish data (Andersson, 1995, 1997; Hoem, 1997b), have
shown that divorce risk varies by shared children, childless couples usually having a higher
divorce risk than couples with children, and couples with small children or when the wife is
pregnant having the lowest divorce risk. For our analysis, we define the variable age of youngest
shared child as a time-varying covariate that has the following categories: no shared children,
wife currently pregnant, youngest child younger than one year, age of youngest child from one to
two, three to five, six to eight, and nine or more years.
It has been shown by Becker, Lands and Michael (1977) and Cherlin (1978) for the United States
and by Hoem (1997a) and Liu (2002) for Sweden that the presence of premarital children
increases the risk of divorce. Based on these results, we include separate control variables for the
number of the wife’s children from previous unions and husband’s children from previous
unions. These variables include all children before the current marriage and whose other parent
is not the current husband or wife. Marriages of second and higher order are more prone to
dissolve than first marriages, which has also been attributed to the notion that relationships in
stepfamilies generally are less harmonious and gratifying (see Furstenberg, 1990). This is
because family norms are usually ambiguous and bonds between stepparents and their children10
are weaker and sometimes fraught with conflict. Erlangsen and Andersson (2001) have recently
shown that divorce risks rise with the order of marriage also in Sweden. We include the order of
the current marriage for the husband to control for this.
2.3. Statistical  analysis
We estimated hazard regression models of the divorce risks, defined as:
l n () () () µα β ij i j l i l
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where t denotes marriage duration,  ) (t i µ represents the intensity of divorce at duration t for
individual i,  ) (t y is the logarithm of the baseline intensity,  ij x  stands for fixed covariates,  j α  for
coefficients for fixed covariates,  ij w  for time-varying covariates, and i β  for coefficients of time-
varying covariates.
The baseline time parameter of the divorce risk is the duration of marriage, which is specified as
a linear spline with nodes at 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 11 years, until observations are censored at 15
years of marriage. Observations are also censored at the emigration or death of either spouse and
at the end of the year 1998, whichever occurs first.
Because of the large size of our data set, we do not use statistical significance as a criterion for
model building or for the assessment of the results: even very small coefficients render statistical
significance. Our selection of control variables into the models is inspired by results of earlier
studies. The rare occasions where a coefficient is not significant according to the likelihood ratio
test at the five-percent level are marked in the tables. We report results from the models listed
below:
Model 1 = control variables + total income + relative income + age difference
Model 1a = Model 1 + total income * relative income
Model 2 = Model 1 + husband’s education level + wife’s education level
Model 3 = Model 2 + relative level of education
Model 3a = Model 3 + relative level of education * relative income
We fit Models 1 and 2 to test the independence effect and income effect simultaneously,
controlling for spouses’ level of education in Model 2 and additionally for relative education in11
Model 3. We also tested the interaction of our two income variables (Model 1a), the interactions
of age difference with relative income, and relative education with relative income (Model 3a).
We used aML software to fit the models (Lillard & Panis, 2000).
3. Results
3.1. Control  variables
The relative divorce risks by the control variables change very little from one model to another,
and those obtained from Model 1 reflect well their effects (Table 2). These effects are consistent
with the results from earlier studies that have motivated us to control for them. Divorce risks
decreased with the wife’s age at marriage. Couples where the wife’s age at first marriage was 20
to 23 had a 70% higher risk of divorce than couples where the wife entered marriage aged 24 to
28; when the wife’s age at marriage was from 29 to 35, the couples’ divorce risk was lower than
in the middle group by 36%.
The more children the wife or the husband had from a previous relationship, the more likely the
marriage was to dissolve. Apparently, the wife's pre-union children have a larger disruptive
effect than those of the husband. Having a shared child is a sign of commitment to the
relationship (Thomson et al., 2002), and this is clearly reflected in the lower divorce risk of
couples with children as compared to childless couples. The risk of divorce also was slightly
higher when the husband had been married before.
Differently from the other control variables, the relative risks by age of youngest shared child
vary between a model that includes economic variables (Model 1) and a model that includes the
demographic control variables only (results not shown). When economic variables are not
included, the divorce risk of childless couples is estimated to be more than three times higher
than the risk of couples with shared children. In Model 1, which also includes most explanatory
variables, the estimated risks of couples whose youngest child is older than two exceed those of
childless couples. The variation among couples with children displays the same pattern in both
models, with the age of the youngest child from three to five years being associated with the
highest divorce risk.
3.2.  Spouses’ income, education, and age difference
We first examine the main effects of the explanatory variables estimated in Model 1, which
includes the demographic control variables and the income variables (Table 3). There was a clear12
linear pattern in the effect of a wife's relative income: the higher the wife's share in the couple’s
income, the higher the divorce risk. When the wife contributed 80% or more to the total income,
the divorce risk was twice as high as when she contributed less than 20%;other categories by
relative income faced a divorce risk between those two extremes. These estimates are controlled
for the couple’s total income. The effect of the couple’s total income also had a linear pattern,
namely that of a decreasing divorce risk by the level of income. This effect was, however,
considerably smaller than that of relative income: the divorce risk of couples in the highest
income category was lower by 21% than that in the lowest income bracket, others were in-
between.
A large age difference between the spouses increased their divorce risk. When the husband was
one or two years older than the wife – which is the most common age configuration – the couple
faced the lowest divorce risk. It increased the more a couple deviated from this. The increase in
the divorce risk was notably larger if the husband was younger than the wife as compared to the
opposite situation. The divorce risk varied only marginally among couples where the wife’s
relative age ranged from five years younger to one year older than the husband’s.
In Model 2 we add both the wife’s and the husband’s level of education, both of which showed a
strong influence on divorce risk (Table 3). A higher education level of either spouse clearly
decreased the divorce risk. A wife’s education has a somewhat larger influence, as couples with
a wife who had attained higher education were half as likely to divorce than couples where the
wife had a low education level. These estimates are controlled for the income variables, but they
change very little only when these variables are removed from the model (results not shown).
This relationship also holds when we add relative education level to the model.
If the wife’s education was higher than that of the husband, the couple had a lower divorce risk
than other couples. There was no difference between couples of the same education level and
couples where the husband’s education was higher than that of the wife. The effect of relative
education on divorce risk is by far smaller than that of relative income.
The inclusion of education level in the model did not have any influence on the relative risks by
relative income, but we noted some influence on the risks by couple’s total income. Given the
correlation between the level of education and income, part of the reduction in divorce risks
represented by the couple’s total income was captured by the level of education. The effect of the
couple’s total income on divorce risks remained also after controlling for education level, but it
no longer showed the linear pattern. The main contrast was between couples in the lowest
income bracket and all the others, whereas the differences between other categories of couple’s13
total income leveled off and, in the case of the highest income bracket, even turned to a slightly
opposite direction.
We now examine the interactive effects of the income variables, starting with the interaction of a
wife’s share in a couple’s income and the couple’s total income. Although the general pattern of
increase in divorce risks by wife’s relative income was observed in most of the couples’ total
income brackets, and the decrease in divorce risk by total income was also observed in most of
the categories of relative income, there were some important interactive effects (Figure 2). When
the husband made the highest share of the combined earnings, only couples in the lowest income
bracket could be distinguished as facing a high divorce risk; other groups by level of income
faced the same divorce risk. When both partners enjoyed about equal incomes or when the wife
earned 60–80% of the total income, there was an obvious decrease in divorce risk by absolute
income. If the wife alone earned a very high income, the divorce risk was much higher than in
any other category, deviating from the pattern of decreasing divorce risk with absolute income.
Although the difference between the divorce risk of these couples and the risk predicted by the
main effects of relative and absolute income was statistically significant in our large data set,
only 0.01% of all couples had such income configuration.
It is worthwhile to look at these interaction effects also from another angle, to highlight that if a
couple’s high income was achieved by approximately equal contribution of both spouses, the
divorce risk was somewhat lower than in couples with a more traditional relative income, that is,
where most of the high combined income came from the husband. This does not follow the
general pattern of increasing divorce risk by wife’s share in a couple’s income. In other income
brackets, the couples with about equal income did not display a deviation from the general
pattern.
The interaction of spouses’ relative income with age difference did not reveal any new pattern:
the effect of relative income was revealed universally in all classes of spouses’ age difference.
However, we noted a small interaction effect of relative income and relative education. Overall,
when the husband had a higher education level than the wife, the couple faced a higher divorce
risk. However, when the wife earned 60–80% of the couple’s income, this relationship did not
hold (Figure 3). Differently from all the other categories of relative income, in this category the
couples where the husband’s education level was higher had the same level of divorce risk as
couples where the wife’s education level was higher.14
4. Discussion
We conducted our analysis using Swedish register data, which has several advantages. Since the
data set covers the entire population, we did not have to be concerned with sampling issues and
statistical power to support the observed substantive differences. We also did not need to deal
with reporting errors that may be encountered in self-reported income data. With the exception
of two recent studies from Finland (Jalovaara, 2001, 2003), most earlier work on the relationship
between individual-level economic variables and divorce risk has been based on sample surveys.
Throughout our analyses, we found strong support for the independence effect hypothesis, as the
divorce risk increased linearly with the share of the wife’s income in the couple’s total income.
We interpret this result in line with the dominant arguments in the literature, according to which
a higher income lowers the wife’s constraint to exit an unhappy marriage. For women whose
income is high in both relative and absolute terms, an additional interpretation may be that a high
absolute income level grants them greater freedom in pursuing individual life goals, and that they
may place high requirements on the qualities of their partner. A couple’s non-traditional income
ratio may have a negative influence on the quality of the relationship by threatening the
traditional division of labor and breadwinner role if these are valued by at least one of the
spouses, usually the husband. The egalitarian value orientations prevailing in Sweden are
assumed to reduce the influence of the non-traditional income ratio of spouses on their
relationship quality. Against this background, the emergence of such a strong independence
effect in our study may be seen as somewhat unexpected. However, results of a recent study
from Finland, where the context of gender relations resembles that of Sweden, were also
consistent with the independence effect (Jalovaara, 2003).
The direction of the causal link between relationship quality and relative income can also be the
opposite one, however. Johnson & Skinner (1986) and Rogers (1999) have shown that increases
in perceived marital discord are related to increases in wives’ income. If this relationship holds
in Sweden, it would explain some of the variation in divorce rates by spouses’ relative income
that we presented.
With register data, it would not be possible to disentangle the relative importance of those
interpretations: a self-supporting wife has a lower threshold to exit an unhappy marriage, the
unconventional power relations resulting from the wife’s higher income decreases the
relationshipquality, or marital discord stimulating wives to increase their income. It is likely that
they all make some contribution to shaping the observed divorce pattern by spouses’ income
ratio.15
The other main finding of our study supports the income effect. Higher income, whether from a
wife's or a husband's earnings, improves the family's quality of life and in this way enhances
marital stability. High total income also increases the amount of assets and property that the
couple owns. This may be accompanied by complicated financial arrangements that increase the
cost of marital dissolution for both spouses and in this way reduce their divorce risk. In
difference to the previous studies that have aimed at distinguishing between the income and the
independence effect (Greenstein, 1990, 1995), our finding points to the existence of this effect,
though the contrasts between different income categories are not large. Jalovaara’s (2003) results
from Finland also point to the direction of the income effect, although she did not test that
explicitly.
We found some weak support for the social exchange hypothesis. When the wife earned 60–80%
of the income and the husband enjoyed a higher education than the wife, the marital union faced
a relatively low divorce risk. Couples with other income ratios had a relatively high risk. Hence,
the argument that education has a compensating effect – although it may be limited – is valid to a
certain extent only. However, no such compensatory effect was evident when the wife
contributed to almost all of the couple’s income. Note that our measures of status, experience
and information are approximate, and more direct measures of exchangeable resources, including
the subjective assessment of the relationship quality, would be necessary to cast more light on
their effect on divorce.
On the whole, we found support for the hypothesis on the equally dependent spouses. However,
the situation of equal dependence had some relevance for the divorce risk of highest earning
couples. Notably, equally dependent spouses with high income faced a lower divorce risk than
couples with high income where the wife’s contribution was 20–40%. Thus, the pattern in the
highest income bracket runs counter to Nock’s (2001) argument, according to which equally
dependent spouses have higher divorce rates than others, whereas in other income brackets the
suggested conjecture is confirmed.
Our study has highlighted that couples where the wife earns more than the husband have a
relatively high divorce risk not only in a traditional set up but also in a society that is organized
on the principles of gender equality and with dominant egalitarian gender views.
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Table 1 Number of divorces and couple-months observed in marriages by the
study variables.
Variable name Category Divorces Couple-months observed
in marriages
Number % Number %
Wife's share in 0–20% 4,046 6 253,928 7
couple’s total income 20–40% 23,452 35 1,329,407 38
40–60% 32,931 49 1,682,854 48
60–80% 4,779 7 184,292 5
80%+ 2,265 3 67,297 2
Couple's total income 0–25.2 22,455 33 985,049 28
(10,000 SEK 25.2–40.3 28,865 43 1,498,054 43
in 1998 value) 40.3–55.5 13,026 19 800,890 23
>55.5 3,127 5 233,786 7
Husband’s education pre–gymnasium 14,403 21 617,654 18
level gymnasium 35,772 53 2,040,000 58
post–gymnasium 5,057 8 497,415 14
unknown 12,241 18 362,710 10
Wife’s education pre–gymnasium 14,672 22 457,454 13
level gymnasium 46,140 68 2,545,498 72
post–gymnasium 5,057 7 436,761 12
unknown 1,604 2 78,066 2
Couple’s relative husband higher than the wife 10,226 15 505,113 14
education level equal 32,772 49 1,986,376 56
wife higher than the husband 11,025 16 598,241 17
either education level unknown 13,450 20 428,051 12
Couple’s age difference husband 6 or more years older 14,524 22 579,379 16
husband 3–5 years older 16,649 25 890,912 25
husband 1–2 years older 16,098 24 946,025 27
age difference smaller than 1 year 11,819 18 717,782 20
wife 1–2 years older 5,073 8 253,519 7
wife 3 or more years older 3,310 5 130,163 4
Wife’s age at marriage 20–23 21,328 32 766,177 22
24–25 29,525 44 1,638,627 47
29–35 16,620 25 1,112,975 32
Number of wife's 0 57,942 86 3,289,566 94
children from previous 1 7,177 11 180,797 5
partnerships 2+ 2,354 3 47,415 1
Number of husband's 0 57,153 85 3,206,953 91
children from previous 1 6,103 9 189,794 5
partnerships 2+ 4,217 6 121,032 3
Age of youngest no child 15,575 23 460,102 13
shared child woman pregnant 319 0 276,114 8
under 1 year 885 1 503,797 14
1–2 years 11,776 17 822,153 23
3–5 years 21,846 32 733,619 21
6–8 years 10,284 15 404,091 11
9 years or older 6,787 10 317,903 9
Husband’s first 61,550 91 3,317,934 94
order of marriage second or higher 5,923 9 199,846 619
Table 2 Relative divorce risk by control
variables.
Variable Category Relative risk
Wife’s age at marriage 20-23 1.70
24-25 1.00
29-35 0.64
Number of wife's 0 1.00
children from previous 1 2.12
partnerships 2+ 2.50
Number of husband's 0 1.00
children from previous 1 1.67
partnerships 2+ 1.68
Age of youngest no child 2.00
shared child woman pregnant 0.05




9 years or older 2.94
Husband’s first 1.00
order of marriage second or higher 1.07
Notes: Estimated from a hazard regression model that
includes all these variables, the two income
variables, and spouse’s age difference (Model 1).
All estimates differ significantly from the reference
category at the one-percent level.20
Table 3 Relative divorce risk by explanatory variables. Estimated from hazard




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Wife’s share in couple’s total
income  0%-20% (ref.) 1.00 1.00 1.00
 20%-40% 1.29 1.38 1.38
 40%-60% 1.51 1.62 1.62
 60%-80% 1.97 2.11 2.12
 80%-100% 2.10 2.19 2.19
Couple’s total income 0-25.2 (ref.) 1.00 1.00 1.00
(10,000 SEK in 1998 value) 25.2-40.3 0.88 0.87 0.87
40.3-55.5 0.83 0.86 0.86
>55.5 0.79 0.92 0.92
Couple’s age difference husband 6 or more years older 1.16 1.12 1.12
husband 3 to 5 years older 1.02 1.00 1.00
husband 1 to 2 years older 0.99 0.98 0.98
age difference smaller than 1 year (ref.) 1.00 1.00 1.00
wife 1 to 2 years older 1.24 1.22 1.22
wife 3 or more years older 1.53 1.48 1.48
Husband’s level of education pre-gymnasium (ref.) 1.00 1.00
gymnasium 0.88 0.83
post-gymnasium 0.71 0.63
Wife’s level of education pre-gymnasium (ref.) 1.00 1.00
gymnasium 0.66 0.69
post-gymnasium 0.52 0.57
Couple’s relative husband's education higher 1.01
level of education same level of education (ref.) 1.00
wife's education higher 0.89
Notes: Relative risks not significantly different from the reference category at five percent level are in italics. All
other estimates are significant at the five-percent level.21
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